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Abstract
We evaluate whether and how the persistence of inequality and the presence of
inequality traps carry over the persistence of poverty and possible aggregate economic
inefficiencies. We propose a microeconomic formalization of one possible definition
of poverty and of the behaviour of poor and rich agents. Poverty is defined as lack
of or low societal participation, which is source of both a direct private benefit and
an indirect gain. Analysing poverty under the individual rational choice, we are able
to endogeneize the threshold amount of the participation good needed to join the
additional indirect benefit as well as the threshold level of income - the poverty line -
needed to buy that amount; further we find the conditions for their existence which in
turn determine also their level. In an overlapping generation structure we show that in
economies starting largely poor two equilibria exist; one low locally stable equilibrium
to which low and middle-income class converge and one upper locally unstable over
the which richer classes of income enter an explosive path, with unbounded growth
rates of personal income. In the rich regime the whole population enter the explosive
path, with unbounded growth rates. We are able to enrich the dynamics a la` Galor
and Zeira (1993) in an economic environment with perfect capital markets, instead of
the assumption of markets imperfections, by introducing a methodological innovation
which connects the presence of the externality in the human capital accumulation of
the children directly to the preference of parents. By further restricting the functional
form of the initial income distribution to be lognormal we find that the mean income
and the variance (i.e. inequality) of the richer part of the distribution are always higher
than the ones of the lower part; moreover, while within the poor class inequality tends
to zero in the very long-run, within the richer class inequality is increasing at an
increasing rate. Finally, a negative relation between initial inequality and economic
growth is observed. The inequality traps which cause the poor regime to emerge are
also sources of aggregate economic inefficiencies, which can be eliminated by reducing
income disparities accordingly.
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“...any city, however small, is in fact divided into two, one the city of the
poor, the other of the rich; these are at war with one another; and in either
there are many smaller divisions, and you would be altogether beside the mark
if you treated them all as a single State. But if you deal with them as many,
and give the wealth or power or persons of the one to the others, you will always
have a great many friends and not many enemies. And your State, while the
wise order which has now been prescribed continues to prevail in her, will be
the greatest of States, I do not mean to say in reputation or appearance, but
in deed and truth, though she number not more than a thousand defenders.”
[Plato, The Republic, Book IV, 422e-423a]
1 Introduction
The first sentence of the above Plato’s quote often circulates in the development literature
(Benabou, 1993). In this sentence Socrates does emphasize two elements. High inequality
and polarization does split most of the contemporary places, either cities or States, in
essentially two or more ones and this division may not fuel the well-being of the whole
society. While much of the economic literature is still debating on the validity of this claim,
we would address the following part of the quote, where Socrates explicitly describes the
two, or more, parts of the society as inherently different. The poor have their own intrinsic
characteristics and behavioral traits which differentiate them from the rich1 such that the
former behave and choose differently from the latter and both accordingly to their own
status. In this paper we take up this issue by considering the effects for positive economics
of assuming that agents do behave accordingly to their specific income status and how
this particular behaviour does influence the more general issue of the relation between
economic growth and income distribution, and how this latter interplay may fuel poverty
patterns. We carry out this task by formalizing on the microeconomic ground the diverse
behaviour of the agents under different income condition and the consequences of this
behaviour. At this regard, this paper tries to connect two very wide literatures; the one
focused on the elaboration of the ideas of poverty and inequality and the other focused on
economic growth and development economics. On the former side – the conceptualization
of poverty and inequality ideas – no large consensus has yet been reached on a large
number of issues. Do we have to treat poverty as an absolute or relative concept? What
do these two approaches imply and how they may be formalized? Is poverty different
from inequality and if so, under which logic? On the other side, it does appear that the
notion of poverty traps is not fully able to capture the relevant role of the relative position
within a society and how this may influence and determine both individual macroeconomic
dynamics. Since Banerjee and Duflo (2007) have shown that even the extremely poor have
a lot of choices, we introduce poverty ideas in the individual rationality of the agents. This
1This position is not recognized in the whole literature. There are authors who maintains, otherwise,
that the poor have no intrinsic features and no particular behavioural trait, but they fail more often than
the rich simply since they are more vulnerable as their budget constraints are much more and much more
often stringent (Bertrand, Mullainathan and Shafir, 2004).
2
is crucial not only for the endogeneization of the threshold amount of the participation
good needed to join an additional indirect benefit as well as the threshold level of income
- the poverty line - needed to buy that amount, but also for the endogeneization of the
conditions which guarantee their existence and which fix their level.
We then employ this microeconomic structure in an overlapping generation model a
la` Galor and Zeira (1993). Differently from the latter, we are able to couple and enrich
their dynamics in an economic environment with perfect capital markets, without needing
the assumption of market imperfections, by introducing a methodological novelty which
connects the presence of the externality in the production function of the human capital
of the children to the preference of the parents.
The paper follows in the second section by introducing the literature related to these
issues. In section 3 the basic structure of the model, with the definitions of the population
structure, poverty, human capital accumulation and production is explored, so that in
section 4 the statically individual equilibrium is computed. In section 5 the individual
dynamics as well as the macroeconomic equilibrium are analysed in the light of the notion
of inequality traps. The last section concludes.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Poverty and inequality: background ideas
Since the seventies a great bulk of literature (Atkinson, 1970; Foster, 1998; Foster et al.,
1984; Sen, 1976, 1997) has made great advances on the issues related to the identifica-
tion of the poor and the aggregation of poverty and inequality measures in tractable and
reasonable functional forms2. These concepts have produced intense debates among ad-
vocates of an absolute view of poverty on a sideand sustainers of a relative position on
the other one, strictly concerned with the suitability, goodness and validity of either one
or other approach. Already Adam Smith dealt with the choice of which approach might
be the more appropriate, expressing a preference for a relative view of poverty, claiming
that not only the physical goods, necessary for the support of the life, but also the com-
modities that become necessary due to the societal influence might be taken into account
when fixing the reference standard. He maintains that a relative position within a society
does matter as long as societal customs force agents in consuming goods otherwise not
necessary for the basic surviving.
In his defense of the absolutist approach, Sen (1983; 1985) does maintain that the two
positions may be conciliated, since a relative position is necessary to achieve an absolute
benefit. The idea is that holding a relatively advantageous position is a source not only of
a direct benefit, in that it allows consuming a specific bundle of goods, but also a source
of a more important gain; namely, a relatively advantageous position in the society allows
to have information that other individuals, the ones falling behind, do not have. He or she
does not, or at least not exclusively, want to be relatively better than others per se. What
2For a survey and more rigorous treatment of both definitional and measurement issues of poverty and
inequality see Ch 3 and Ch 6 in Atkinson and Bourguignon (2000).
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he or she actually desires is to be absolutely well; a relative advantage is then functional
to the achievement of this absolute gain. Townsend (1985) sustains that a relative view
of poverty must be the main guide for the assessment of welfare judgments, especially in
rich areas. This position tends to criticize the absolutist approach, viewing in this latter a
constant inclination in confusing and associating relative poverty to inequality. Although
poverty and inequality may be closely linked (Foster, 1998), especially when a relative
approach is adopted, they still deserve different treatment for their own intrinsic features.
“[T]he fact that some people have a lower standard of living than others is certainly proof
of inequality, but by itself it cannot be a proof of poverty unless we know something more
about the standard of living that these people do in fact enjoy” (Sen, 1983).
Another source of confusion is likely due to the notion of relative deprivation (Runci-
man, 1966). Relative deprivation or deprivation with regard to some specific reference
group does not necessarily entail equalization of poverty and inequality. Once the appro-
priate reference space is taken into account, it might be argued that absolute deprivation
over some space (i.e. information, opportunity, and so forth) may be source of a relative
deprivation over other spaces (i.e. income, consumption, and so forth), and both being
still very different from inequality, as - for instance - “a sharp fall in general prosperity
causing widespread starvation and hardship must be seen by any acceptable criterion of
poverty as an intensification of poverty. But the stated view of poverty as an issue of
”inequality” can easily miss this if the relative distribution is unchanged and there is no
change in the differences between the bottom 20 or 10 per cent and the rest of the society”
(Sen, 1983).
These extensive issues have been fitted in literatures which attempt to track the effects
of poverty or unequal positions on positive economics, through microeconomic studies of
the intrinsic characteristics of the poor. A large bulk of literature has included the ideas of
minimum consumption requirements in growth models to assess the role of income distri-
bution on economic growth and vice versa (Chatterjee, 1994; Chatterjee and Ravikumar,
1997). More recently, an effort is being accomplished in the microfoundation of poor’s
behaviour. Banerjee and Newman (1994) focus on the idea of “closeness to the lower
bounds” to show how this affect behaviour, choices and incentives of the agents. Banerjee
(2000) stresses the consequences for positive and normative economics of two notions of
poverty: namely, poverty as “desperation” and poverty as “vulnerability”3. In the former
case, the threat of punishment does not work, or at least it works less well, since the poor
behaves as they had nothing to lose. On the other side, vulnerable agents are afraid of
any losses since any potential failing causes them too much pain. This difference, it is
shown, to decisively affect not only their own behaviour and choices, but also the aggre-
gate dynamics. Banerjee and Mullainathan (2007) have presented new ideas to formalize,
on a microeconomic ground, the behaviour of the poor. In an economy with “temptation
goods”, the authors supply a model in which the degree of temptedness is endogenous and
may vary between rich and poor. This setting should allow explain several behavioural
puzzles empirically found in the choices of the poor.
We proceed on this branch of research by relating our work closely to the one by Lewis
3On these issues see also Banerjee, Benabou and Mookherjee (2006) and Morduch (1994).
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and Ulph (1988) who offer a microeconomic model of poverty, suggesting microeconomic
principles for building utility functions, which can take into account the above discussion
on the meaning of poverty as relative or absolute concepts. Feature of the poor is the
lack of, or low, societal participation, which is source of two benefits. A direct benefit
deriving from its consumption and, more importantly, an indirect advantage stemming
from the fact that its consumption is source of relevant information acquisition as well.
In order to buy this good a minimum level of income – the poverty line – is needed. The
shortage is, in turn, due to an absolute lack of resources (i.e. income), which negatively
affects their opportunities and their absolute welfare. This feature tends to capture a
particular aspects of being poor; namely, “...being poor is discretely different from being
non-poor, and that this is associated with discrete changes in consumer behaviour and,
possibly, utility” (Lewis and Ulph, 1988). We capture this feature linking the discrete
change in the income level with a discrete jump in the indirect utility function. The
analysis on the extent of poverty is hence based upon the individual rational choice. If
individuals are extremely poor as they are unable to consume some specific goods (i.e. the
participation good), this aspect should not be exogenously described, but directly derived
from the optimizing, rational behaviour of the agents. Was this good so important, why
agents should rationally decide of not consuming it? Hence, the discrete jump in the
indirect utility function is formalized by allowing the agents to make a choice between two
kind of goods. A divisible normal good whose consumption ensures only direct benefit
and another kind of good – the participation good, which may be either divisible or not
and whose consumption increases utility in two ways; directly, as its consumption yields
immediate private benefits and indirectly as its consumption over a threshold (i.e. the
poverty line) adds up an additional gain. Participating in social activities does, in fact,
entail a cost; only who is able to afford this cost may exploit both the advantages this
commodity furnishes. This participation has two effects on utility. A direct one, since
everyone, to say, might be happier in going out with friends, and an indirect one, since
this participation is source of another and greater benefit; namely, it is source of relevant
information acquisition. Although a minimum amount of participation activities may
entails low costs, the consumption of such a low level does not allow agents in exploiting
the further more important benefit of information acquisition. Further, despite the fact
that the feature of this kind of good may be quite common (i.e. club’s membership, and
so forth) – namely goods which may be consumed only over a minimum income level, the
specific characteristic of this participation good is that its consumption over a threshold
(the poverty line) entails an advantage so high that consumers are willing to sacrifice all
the consumption of the discretionary good to enjoy the benefits of the former. As soon as
income level reaches the threshold, agent is well willing to renounce to the discretionary
good to exploit the benefits deriving from the consumption of the participation good. It
is this characteristic that makes this participation good a “poverty good”, in that not
owning it makes agents so discontented that they never renounce to it, whenever they
can. We are hence referring not to extreme poverty situations, in which agents does not
have the basic needs for surviving, but a broader aspect of poverty definition.
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2.2 Human Capital and “Inequality Traps”
Based upon this microeconomic framework we construct a dynamic model in the attempts
to analyse whether and the extent to which the persistence of inequality may augment the
persistence of poverty, even in growing economies. We build an overlapping generation
model in which the dynamics of income distribution of the generations are mapped one-
to-one to those of human capital accumulation, as the production function, on the firm
side, depends only on this last factor. Individuals are supposed initially heterogeneous
in human capital. Given that there exists a one-to-one mapping from human capital
to income dynamics, in each period this is equivalent to assume that individuals differs
only for different income – or human capital – endowments4. In each period each parent
has to choose how to split his budget into the consumption of the discretionary good,
the participation good and investment for education of their children, which is supposed
to occur in the standard form of “joy of giving”. Each parent cares of the future well-
being of the children, which depends on the amount of human capital these latter may
accumulate in the future period. Human capital production of the children is function
of parental expenditures in education and of parental human capital background. This
latter depends in turn upon the amount of participation good consumed by the parents.
When parents are able to afford to consume the participation good they will do as soon
as they have not to renounce to the investment in educational expenditures, as physical
investments in education and parental background are complementary in the production
of children human capital, while they may decide to completely renounce in consuming
the discretionary good. As result, human capital production presents a strong non-convex
technology in that the consumption of the participation good, over the poverty line, does
increase its final production, at an increasing rate. This setting does entail to assume
that the poor enjoy relatively lower net marginal returns from education than the rich
do. This assumption, while enough common in great part of the literature (Benabou,
1996; Durlauf, 1996; Galor and Tsiddon, 1997a; Galor and Zeira, 1993) is criticized as it
is sustained that empirically it is less often observed this kind of non-convexities in the
technology of the production of human capital (Ceroni, 2001). Nevertheless, some caveats
are worthwhile to be explored. Human capital marginal returns are commonly assumed
to be decreasing in educational investments, as by its nature human capital is embodied
in human being, and its “physical” accumulation is obviously bounded. However, this
observation cannot imply the renounce to the assumption of global increasing returns from
human capital accumulation, whenever this production increases, at increasing rates, due
to a complementary factor, which in our case depends on initial income distribution of
the parents. Summing up, human capital production function shows decreasing marginal
returns when parents are not able to spread its production with the accumulation of the
participation good – the case of the poor dynasties. It presents, otherwise, an increasing
returns technology in the case of rich dynasties, which are able to speed up its production
by allowing their children to better exploit the “physical” investment in education as
a result of the higher information obtained from the consumption of the participation
4In the rest of the paper, we will then use interchangeably the two words.
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good. This jump in the curvature of the production function of human capital derives
from the discrete jumps in the indirect utility function of the parents, and it introduces a
methodological innovation which connects the externality in the human capital production
function of the children with the preference of the agents. Given that also the relative
position in the distribution does matter, the externality stems not only from the absolute
economic possibilities of the agents, but also from the knowledge these ones have on its
effect and from the value they attach to this externality with respect to the other parts
of the distribution. We are hence able to couple and enrich the dynamics a la` Galor and
Zeira (1993) in an economic environment characterised by perfect capital markets, instead
of needing to assume market imperfections.
In each period individual income distributions are linked to the previous ones through
the intergenerational transmission of both educational expenditures and participation com-
modities. Two cases can be distinguished. When poverty is strikingly high two equilibria
do exist; one locally stable and the other unstable. Generations that start with an in-
come below the poverty line are condemned in the low equilibrium, while those that start
rich enough to afford both educational investment and participation good deserve a fur-
ther analysis. Richer dynasties present, in fact, a dual dynamics. Who is sufficient rich
to consume an enough high amount of both educational investments and participation
goods will end up behind the locally unstable steady state on an explosive path, on which
their wealth will grow unbounded. On the other side, middle income dynasties, which are
closer to the poverty line, will not be able to grow along the explosive path and will be
condemned to end up in the lower steady state, even if they achieve in buying both the
goods. In this case poverty reduction is positively correlated with reduction in inequality
so that the persistence in inequality carries over the persistence in poverty as well, even
in growing economies (Durlauf, 1996). In the other case, when poverty is quite low, there
does exist no steady state as the whole population ends up on the explosive path, with
unbounded growth rates, without any segmentation within the society.
In the former case, the economy is trapped in “inequality traps” (Bourguignon, Ferreira
and Walton, 2007) rather than in poverty traps. The notion of inequality traps is still
crude as this is a very new branch of research, opened up to answer some questions
mainly relating to the John Roemer’s idea of equality of opportunity (Roemer, 1998).
This very infant literature has not yet precisely clarified the notion of inequality trap as
well as its difference from poverty traps. For the first time, we propose to integrate these
notions in an economic growth and development model, which takes contemporaneously
into account the group-specific behaviour, in order to start filling an apparent weakness of
the literature on poverty traps. We refer to the idea of considering poor simply the ones
who are below some equilibrium thresholds, without taking into account that the poor have
their own particular behaviour as well as that the condition of being poor might derive
and perpetuate from a condition of relatively disadvantage with respect to other parts of
the distribution. “...Inequality traps...describe situations where the entire distribution is
stable because the various dimension of inequality (in wealth, power, and social status)
interact to protect the rich from downward mobility and to prevent the poor from being
upward mobile” (Rao, as quoted in Bourguignon et al., 2007). What distinguishes the
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inequality traps from the more classic poverty traps is that the latter refer to poverty
without looking at the other part of the distribution (i.e. top and middle income), but
only looking at the poor, individually and without any reference to group dynamics.
“In a poverty trap, the incomes of the poor do not grow beyond some fixed
threshold: the poor remain forever poor...An inequality trap, on the other
hand, does allow for the advantages of the poor to grow over time, as long
as patterns of unequal relative advantage persist in the long run. The dy-
namics of such persistent differences in opportunities are affected by the entire
distribution of advantage, reflecting (economic, political and socio-cultural)
interactions across groups” (Bourguignon et al., 2007).
Further insights are then derived looking at the intra-group dynamics through the restric-
tion of the functional form of the initial distribution of human capital. If initial human
capital is assumed to be lognormally distributed (Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; Gradstein
and Justman, 1997) it is possible to show that the mean income as well as the variance
(i.e. inequality) of the richer dynasties grows faster than that of the poorer ones. These
dynamics may furnish positive support to the current debate on the demise of the mid-
dle class and the constantly polarization of the societies. At aggregate level, finally, the
inverse relationship between initial income distribution and aggregate economic growth is
observed, as lower initial inequality fosters higher growth rates.
3 Model
3.1 Population
A continuum of individuals, indexed by i, is modelled in an overlapping generation econ-
omy, in which each of them lives for two periods, dying at the end of the second one.
In each period t, each family is composed by a parent and a child and at the end of the
second period each individual gives birth to another such that total population is constant
over time. In each period the economy is then inhabited by heterogeneous families differ-
entiated by the initial income of the parents, which are distributed according to an initial
probability distribution g0(). In the first period of their life, children obtain education,
financed out by their parents. Parents have to choose how to split their budget among
three goods. A discretionary good c, which gives only a direct private benefit, a partici-
pation good z, which furnishes a direct benefit by increasing utility of the parents as well
as an indirect benefit, whenever consumed over a threshold z ≥ 0, by augmenting both
the parental utility, linearly, and the human capital accumulation function of the children,
exponentially, through a stock parameter θ, and finally educational expenditures e. In the
second period of their life, depending on the amount of educational investment e and the
amount of the participation good consumed by their parents, children accumulate human
capital which is one-to-one mapped to income.
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3.2 Preference
Individuals have identical preferences, which are defined by
U it (c, z, e; θ) = α log
(
cˆit
)
+ (1− α) log (zit + θ (zit))+ γ log (eit) (1)
with
θ
(
zit
)
=
{
0 if zit < z
1 if zit ≥ z
(2)
cˆit = max
[
1, cit
]
(3)
with 0 < α < 1 and γ > 0 is the degree of altruism of the parents. Condition (2) describes
the feature of the participation good z; its consumption over the threshold implies an
additional benefit which makes the utility non-homothetic. Condition (3) is a simplifying
normalization, needed to make utility function defined when the parents find optimum to
bring consumption of the discretionary good, c, at zero.
In the utility in (1) it is explicit that the non-homotheticity of the function is not
global but it appears only for a range of high incomes. Given that this non-homotheticity
is due to the characteristics of the participation good, it is clearer the idea that closer
the consumers are to the income poverty line, which will be determined as function of the
threshold z of the participation good z, higher are their incentives in changing behaviour
towards the purchase of that commodity, as they correctly know the additional benefits it
furnishes.
The structure in (1) implies that ∀c ≥ 0, z ≥ 0, e ≥ 0, U (c, z, e; 0) and U (c, z, e; θ) are
defined and twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and concave in c, z and
e. Further, ∀c ≥ 0, z ≥ 0, e ≥ 0, U (c, z, e; 1) > U (c, z, e; 0) implies that participation is
good. Finally, we make the following key assumption on the behaviour of the agents.
Assumption 1 For each individual i and each period t,
U (0, z, e∗; θ) > U (c, z, e∗; 0) (4)
with
e∗ = arg max
c≥0,z≥0,e≥0
{U (c, z, e; θ) = α log (cˆ) + (1− α) log (z + θ) + γ log (e)}
subject to
c+ z + e ≤ y
θ = 0⇒ z < z
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and y is the consumer disposable income, over the minimum amount needed for the basic
needs.
This is the main assumption needed for describing consumer behaviour and formalizing
the definition of poverty we have sketched in the above sections, following which the
gain from participation are so large that consumer is perfectly disposed to renounce to
consume all the discretionary good c in order to purchase the threshold amount, z, of the
participation good z.
The role of the investments in education, e, must be clarified. In assumption 1 we
assume that while for each agent it is perfectly rational to sacrifice the consumption of all
the discretionary good, it is not rational and then she will not bring at zero educational
investments neither she will decide to decrease its consumption at a level lower than the
optimum amount chosen just before reaching the poverty line. This hypothesis on the
behaviour of the agent is due to a couple of reasons. Firstly, had we assumed that rational
agent might decide to reduce a bit the consumption in educational investment to be able
to purchase the participation good, we would very likely lose the discrete jump, which
characterizes our definition of poor. More precisely, the poor is different from the rich
in that reaching the poverty line means that she becomes able in buying relevant goods
in excess to the ones she was purchasing just before reaching that poverty line; in this
sense, the jump tries to capture the figure by which the agent, once reached the poverty,
becomes able to buy goods that before she cannot. The other rationale for this choice
is that, as we will show soon, there does exist a complementarity between educational
investments and societal participation in the human capital accumulation, such that it
is neither worthwhile to bring educational expenditures at zero neither reduce them at a
level lower that its optimal amount, only for purchasing an additional commodity, even
though this furnishes a great benefit. Indeed, if it would be the case that, when reached
the poverty line, the agent find optimum to reduce educational investments, it would
imply that the choice made by the agent just before reaching that poverty line was not an
optimum. As it will be shown in the next section, this setting produces a discrete jump in
the choice of the goods, expressed by a sharp discontinuity in the indirect utility function
of the agents. Finally, it results now clearer why we need to impose condition (3) above
to make the utility function defined for consumption of the discretionary good c at zero.
3.3 Human Capital Accumulation
Human capital, and hence income, of the children is accumulated in each period and for
each family through the following technology
hit+1 =
(
eit
)β (
hit
)θ(zit) (5)
where 0 < β < 1.
In each period, parents have a double role in the production of the human capital
of their children; through a directly “physical” investment in education and by passing
on to the children their human capital background. This latter is augmented, at an
increasing rate, by the opportunity they have to participate in social activities at a level
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higher than the threshold, such to be able to exploit the additional benefit given by the
parameter θ. So, while human capital accumulation shows decreasing marginal returns
from “physical” education, it has globally increasing marginal returns for high income
levels, due to the presence of the complementary factor, hθ. This hypothesis means that,
overall, the poor show lower net marginal returns from human capital accumulation than
the rich, as they are “excluded” from that kind of social activities, which spread up that
accumulation by furnishing relevant information. This information would, for instance,
refer to the opportunities opened by studying or yet to the way through which improving
the outcomes of educational effort. So a poor family which is only able to afford educational
expenditures, but not social activities above the threshold level, will have a decreasing
returns to scale technology for production of human capital (i.e. θ = 0), while richer
families (i.e. θ = 1) will have an increasing returns to scale technology.
3.4 Production
The aggregate production is very simple. The unique factor of production is human capital,
so that
Yt = Ht =
ˆ
I
hitgt
(
hit
)
dhit (6)
where Ht is the aggregate stock of human capital at time t, expressed in efficiency units of
labour, and gt
(
hit
)
is the density function describing the distribution of the parent’s human
capital at time t, with
´
I gt
(
hit
)
dhit = 1. In each period, parents supply inelastically their
efficiency units of labour receiving a wage, such that their income is yit = h
i
t.
4 Individual behaviour
In this section we compute the individual equilibrium based upon the characteristics of
the utility function and the assumptions we made in the previous section.
In each period t, each agent i will face on with the following programme
maxU it
(
cit, z
i
t, e
i
t; θ
)
= α log
(
cˆit
)
+ (1− α) log (zit + θ (zit))+ γ log (eit) (7)
subject to
cit + z
i
t + e
i
t ≤ yit (8)
θ
(
zit
)
=
{
0 if zit < z
1 if zit ≥ z
(9)
cˆit = max
[
1, cit
]
(10)
cit ≥ 0, zit ≥ 0, eit ≥ 0 (11)
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Parents care of their children in the form of “joy of giving”. They do not internalize
the overall welfare of their children (Becker, 1974, 1979), in which case they would have
maximized over their whole future human capital, ht+1. They, instead, choose how much
of their budget in (8) to spend on investment for education of their children. We use this
latter approach, since in the former one we would have implicitly assumed parents had a
perfectly direct control also on the stock parameter θ, while they do not, as they can only
control it indirectly through their disposable income.
4.1 Conditional indirect utility functions
In order to find the consumer optimum choices we need to determine the income threshold,
the poverty line, at which the agent does consider rationally optimal to change behaviour
by purchasing the amount while keeping on consuming his optimal choice of educational
investment. At this end we proceed in two steps, by computing the indirect utility func-
tions conditioned on the specific income status, evaluating the optimum for each of them,
and finally the general optimal solution.
4.1.1 Poor dynasties
Poor generations starting with a level of income, yit, which does not allow to buy the
minimum level of the participation good, z, to accede to the additional benefits will choose
c, z and e such to solve the following programme
maxU it
(
cit, z
i
t, e
i
t; θ = 0
)
= α log
(
cˆit
)
+ (1− α) log (zit)+ γ log (eit) (12)
subject to
cit + z
i
t + e
i
t ≤ yit (13)
cˆit = max
[
1, cit
]
(14)
cit ≥ 0, zit ≥ 0, eit ≥ 0 (15)
The first order conditions (FOC) are(
cit
)∗
NP
=
α
1 + γ
yit,
(
zit
)∗
NP
=
1− α
1 + γ
yit,
(
eit
)∗
NP
=
γ
1 + γ
yit (16)
Consumers do split proportionally their budget across the three goods – i.e. the func-
tion is homothetic for this range of income. To this conditions is it associated the following
indirect utility function for the poor, that do not participate (“NP”), V NP (y; θ = 0)
V NP (y; θ = 0) = α log
(
α
1 + γ
y
)
+ (1− α)
(
1− α
1 + γ
y
)
+ γ log
(
γ
1 + γ
y
)
(17)
where ”xNP ” are the optimum solutions in the poor regime, where the individuals are
unable to fully participate in social activities and do not accede to the additional benefit
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θ. Marginal utility of each good is infinite at zero and increasing in income; it is further
verified that c
′
NP (y) > 0, z
′
NP (y) > 0, e
′
NP (y) > 0 and cNP (y = 0) = 0, zNP (y = 0) =
0, eNP (y = 0) = 0.
4.1.2 Rich Dynasties
Correspondingly, rich dynasties will solve a programme similar to the one in (12)-(15),
but being able to exploit the additional benefit from the participation good; namely,
maxU it
(
cit, z
i
t, e
i
t; θ = 1
)
= α log
(
cˆit
)
+ (1− α) log (zit + 1)+ γ log (eit) (18)
subject to
cit + z
i
t + e
i
t ≤ yit (19)
cˆit = max
[
1, cit
]
(20)
cit ≥ 0, zit ≥ 0, eit ≥ 0 (21)
where in this case income y is high enough to let the consumer buying each of the three
good over the consumption of the amount z.
The FOC are
(
cit
)∗
P
=
α
1 + γ
yit +
α
1 + γ
,
(
zit
)∗
P
=
1− α
1 + γ
yit −
α+ γ
1 + γ
,
(
eit
)∗
P
=
γ
1 + γ
yit +
γ
1 + γ
(22)
Obviously, all the three goods are consumed in larger amounts; even the good z, which
does appear having a corner solution. Indeed, as these solutions correspond to very rich
agents which are consuming over the threshold amount z, the corner solution implied in
(22) does not means that the actual consumption of the good z is at zero, as it is at the
threshold level z. As before, the optimal choices are increasing in income and to them it
is associate a correspondingly indirect utility functions for the rich, who are able to fully
participate in social activities and then can exploit the additional benefit θ, V P (y; θ = 1).
4.1.3 Static equilibrium
Looking at the marginal consumer, we derive the conditions under which a threshold
amount of the good z does exist and hence the poverty line - the threshold level of in-
come needed to buy the threshold amount of the participation good - and we prove that
assumption 1 actually characterizes the behaviour of the agents.
Proposition 1 (Existence and level of the threshold) Whenever either the degree
of altruism (γ) is not extremely low or the consumption share on the good z is not ex-
tremely low or both, a threshold amount of the participation good z ≡ z ∈ [z◦, z◦◦] such
that assumption 1 holds and actually describes the behaviour of the agents does exist and
it is bounded in the interval [z◦, z◦◦], with z◦◦ > z◦.
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Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 1 not only does ensure that a threshold which shapes the behaviour of the
agents such as initially described in assumption 1 does in fact exist, but it also binds the
level of the threshold in a closed interval such that z ∈ [z◦, z◦◦]. The width of this interval
depends in turn on the degree of altruism of the parents (γ) and on the consumption
shares on the goods z (1− α) and c (α); indeed, such a threshold does exist whenever
either the degree of altruism (γ) is not extremely low or the consumption share on the
good z (1− α) (c (α)) is not extremely low (high) or both. In the appendix (Figure A.2)
we provide simulations from which it results that for a wide and very reasonable range of
the parameters γ and α proposition 1 results verified. In a recent study on the customs of
the poor in 13 countries Banerjee and Duflo (2007) report that unexpectedly the poor do
not spend their whole income in food, while a large share of it is indeed spent on non-food
consumption. In particular, they document that participation goods account for a large
share of the income of the extremely poor; in most of the surveyed countries spendings on
festivals - for instance - account for a share of the income of the extremely poor households
higher than the 40%, reaching in many cases percentages ranging between the 70% and the
99% of the total income. Contrary to the conventional wisdom which claims that the poor
do not have choices as they are forced to spend all their income in basic goods, Banerjee
and Duflo (2007) show that even the extremely poor have a lot of choices which they
decide to exercise not in the direction of more basic goods. This conclusion fits perfectly
our theoretical strategy of analysing poverty under the individual rational choice of the
agents, allowing these to rationally choose whether and how much of the discretionary good
either to consume or to renounce. Coupling the individual rationality with the fact that
the linkage between the parents utility and the children accumulation of human capital is
driven also by the initially relative position of the household in the distribution of income
we can explain why even the existence and the level of the threshold are endogenously
determined. A threshold amount of the poverty good (i.e. the participation good z) does
indeed not always exist; its existence will depend on the particular relation between the
degree of altruism of the parents and the shares of income which they decide to spend
on the discretionary and the participation goods; once a threshold exists, its level will be
hence bounded in a closed interval since a considerably low threshold would not relevantly
influence agents behaviour, while a considerably high threshold would reveal that agents
do not forsee the possibility of reaching that threshold and hence they do not take actually
into account the existence of such a threshold. Higher the degree of altruism and lower
(higher) the share of income spent on the discretionary good (the participation good),
larger the likelihood that a threshold does actually exist. Lower is the share of income
spent on the discretionary good, more difficult it results for the agents to renounce to
such a good, and higher is the degree of altruism, more important it is for the parents the
accumulation of the children human capital.
Whenever the agents see the consumption of the participation good as entailing a
threshold effect, we can endogenously determine also the threshold level of income - the
poverty line - needed to buy this minimum amount of the good z, as
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Proposition 2 (Poverty line and optimal choices) ∀z ≡ z ∈ [z◦, z◦◦], the threshold
level of income – the poverty line in terms of the amount z of the good z, at which she find
rationally optimum to sacrifice all the consumption of the discretionary good c to buy the
minimum amount of good z, z, while keeping on investing in education at its optimal level
e∗NP , is yt ≡ y = z (1 + γ). For level of income lower than y the optimal decision is given
by (16), while for level of income equal to or higher than y the optimal choice is given by
(22).
Proof. See appendix.
What characterizes the poor is the discrete jump they do at the poverty line. The general
optimal solution to the problem (7)-(11) can be formally expressed, for each individuals i
and period t, from the triple
(c∗, z∗, e∗) =
{
(c∗NP , z
∗
NP , e
∗
NP ) if y < y
(c∗P , z
∗
P , e
∗
P ) if y ≥ y
(23)
where y ≡ z (1 + γ).
The condition y ≥ y might imply that for values of y close to the poverty line, y,
the consumer would restrict the consumption of z at z. However, even this possibility is
excluded when noticing that:
Lemma 1 ∀y ≥ y, cP and eP are strictly increasing and zP non-decreasing in y. Moreover
for values of zP > z, zP is strictly increasing in y as well.
5 Dynamics and “Inequality Traps”
In each period the links within generations are described by the evolution of the human
capital accumulation and hence income distribution dynamics through the intergenera-
tional transmission of educational expenditures and parental human capital background.
At any point in time, the current distribution of income (i.e. human capital) shapes the
distribution tomorrow. We explore how the presence of “inequality traps” carries over
the persistence of poverty by firstly evaluating the dynamics governing individual accu-
mulation of human capital and hence personal income, then analysing their evolution
within groups, by restricting the functional form of the income distribution and finally
by commenting on the macroeconomic equilibrium. Two main cases will be throughout
distinguished, depending on whether the initial level of poverty is high or low.
5.1 Individual Dynamics
From the static equilibrium above, we know that in each period t parents pass on their
children the following optimal educational investments
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(
eit
)∗ ≡

(
eit
)∗
NP
=
γ
1 + γ
hit if h
i
t < h
(
eit
)∗
P
=
γ
1 + γ
hit +
γ
1 + γ
if hit ≥ h
(24)
with h ≡ y = z (1 + γ) the poverty line expressed in terms of the good z.
The transition equation of the personal human capital accumulation of their children
is determined by (5) as
(
hit+1
)
= φ
(
hit
) ≡

φNP
(
hit
)
=
(
γ
1 + γ
)β (
hit
)β if hit < h
φP
(
hit
)
=
(
γ
1 + γ
)β (
hit + 1
)β
hit if h
i
t ≥ h
(25)
The transition equation presents a jump in its curvature corresponding to the discrete
jump in the indirect utility function of the individuals we took as our definition of poverty.
In particular, while in the first part of its support it shows decreasing returns to scale
(i.e. concave), in the range of higher incomes it is convex with increasing returns to
human capital accumulation. This feature captures the idea that rich families are in
better position – have better opportunities – to better exploit the gains from education
as they are able to have additional benefits in terms of relevant information acquisition
which in turn do speed up the overall human capital accumulation.
In order to analyse these dynamics let’s notice that for each individual i, the followings
are verified
Lemma 2 ht+1 = φNP (ht) =
(
γ
1+γ
)β
(ht)
β is defined only for ht ∈ [0, h). Over this sup-
port it is strictly increasing and strictly concave; moreover, φNP (0) = 0 and lim
ht→0
φ
′
NP (ht) =
∞ imply that that whenever it intersects the 45-degree line it will do it from above. This
implies that whenever a steady state does exists it is locally stable, since φ
′
NP (h
∗
L) < 1,
where this low-steady state h∗L is defined as h
∗
L =
(
γ
1+γ
)(β/1−β)
.
Lemma 3 ht+1 = φP (ht) =
(
γ
1+γ
)β
(ht + 1)
β ht is defined over the support for ht ∈
[h,∞) and is strictly increasing and strictly convex. The high steady state, whenever it
exists, is then locally unstable, since φ
′
P (h
∗
H) > 1, with h
∗
H defined by h
∗
H =
1
γ .
These two lemma allow to completely define the individual dynamics, distinguishing
two key cases, depending on whether the initial level of poverty is either low (poverty
regime) or high (rich regime).
Proposition 3 (Poverty Regime) If h > h∗L, that is if the level of poverty is initially
high, two equilibria exist; a low locally stable (h∗L) and an upper locally unstable (h
∗
H). Poor
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and middle-income dynasties are condemned to end up in the lower stable equilibrium –
h∗L, while the richer ones, with initial income equal to or above h
∗
H , will enter an explosive
path, with unbounded income growth.
Proof. If h > h∗L, the transition equation φNP (ht) intersects the 45-degree line at h
∗
L
from above, implying stability of equilibrium. Correspondingly, under assumption
2, the transition equation φP (ht) it will strictly increase starting from z, intersecting
the 45-degree line from below at h∗H , implying both unstable equilibrium – h
∗
H – and
explosive path above this equilibrium.
Proposition 4 (Rich Regime) If h < h∗L that is if the level of poverty is initially low,
no equilibria exist. The whole population will enter the explosive path, with unbounded
growth.
In this case, indeed, even the poorer part of the distribution is able to buy the minimum
amount of the participation good such that their children may accumulate human capital
following ht+1 = φP (ht) in (25) (figure 1).
Figure 1: Individual dynamics. Poor versus rich regime
45◦
0 h2 h∗L h
1 h∗H ht
Poor RegimeRich Regime
ht+1
If the level of societal poverty is quite high, h ≡ h1 > h∗L, two classes of equilibrium are
possible. Dynasties starting with an income h lower than the low-equilibrium converge to
it as well as middle-income dynasties that start with a level of income h higher than h∗L but
not high enough to sustain a positive consumption of both the educational investments
and participation goods. Indeed, while very rich families, with income h > h∗H , will grow
unboundedly over an explosive path, middle-income or vulnerable dynasties, h ∈ (h1, h∗H),
that are above the poverty line, but very close to it, are condemned to end up on the lower
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steady state. On the other side, in an economy starting very rich, h ≡ h2 < h∗L, dynasties
evolve along the explosive path, with “globally” unbounded growth rates.
These results belong to the tradition of the Stiglitz’s (1969) ones, following which
economies starting very poor are characterised by multiple equilibria, with the lower part
of the distribution showing a continuous worsening with respect to the upper part of the
distribution. This consideration brings about another direct one. It is often assumed
that reduction in inequality may be a powerful tool for reducing poverty especially in low
poverty environments. Otherwise, we have shown that it is not the case, as the higher
the initial level of poverty the higher the power of egalitarian policies in reducing poverty,
improving aggregate economic efficiency and hence increasing aggregate output. In turn
these results do appear to confirm the claim and the needs of a recent part of the literature
focusing on pro-poor growth policies.
5.2 Inequality Traps and Intra-group dynamics
The low-equilibrium arising in the poor regime is closer to the notion of “inequality traps”
than to the more classic poverty traps. As explained in the introduction, with the term
inequality trap (Bourguignon, Ferreira and Walton, 2007) the literature is attempting
to pointing out the importance of looking at the whole distribution rather than only at
specific kind of individuals – poor versus rich. A specific characteristic of the inequality
traps is the permanent non-convergence in the opportunities opened to some social groups,
verified also, but not only, by the existence of multiple limiting distributions. Although
this new branch of the literature has not fully explored the notion of inequality trap, a
feature which differentiates it from the poverty traps is that “there must be persistence in
relative positions in a distribution across time periods, and that this be (partly) a product
of features of the overall distribution – or of relations between groups” (Bourguignon,
Ferreira and Walton, 2007). A consequence is that this persistence often does lead to
efficiency losses, “resulting in an economic equilibrium that is inferior to some feasible
alternatives” (Bourguignon, Ferreira and Walton, 2007), as it does happen in our case,
where the poor regime is inferior to the other equilibrium – the rich regime, which would
be feasible by reducing inequality and allowing the poorer part of the distribution in
participating in social activities in the relevant range.
In order to preliminarily catch this point, let’s consider what would happen by in-
creasing the level of income of the poor and middle classes or, equivalently, by reducing
the poverty line, which would correspond to reduce the price at which the participation
good might be bought. The economy might enter the rich regime, under which every
individual enter the explosive path with unbounded growth rates. Graphically (figure 1),
let’s suppose that at time t = 0 the economy is trapped in a poor regime, with a level of
poverty determined by the poverty line h1 ≡ z (1 + γ). Either redistributing income from
the upper classes to lower and middle ones, which would imply increasing the individual
level of income of the latter classes and then a shifting up of the lower equilibrium, h∗L,
or by reducing the price, z, at which it is possible to buy the societal participation or
both, the economy would end up in the rich regime, with no poverty and higher aggregate
output.
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In a poor and polarized society, redistribution of income from the upper to the lower-
middle classes as well as making the access to the societal participation less stringent
would allow the entire economy to both grow richer and to substantially reduce individual
poverty. That is, we would have got another feasible equilibrium which is superior to
the former one. At this regard and as shown below at aggregate level, the efficiency
losses in the poor regime stem from the fact that: 1) the aggregate output is lower under
poor regime than under the rich one; 2) this is in turn due to the fact that in the poor
regime not only the poor class is unable to accumulate the same amount of human capital
accumulated by the richer families, but also the middle-income it is not, even though
it has the same access to the participation good. Indeed, the vulnerable class ends up
in the lower equilibrium even if it is able to spend how the richer class for educational
investments. At aggregate level, this wastage of economic resources produces the above
economic inefficiency. Reducing inequality, in this case, would generate both the reduction
of poverty and the macroeconomic efficiency.
In order to deepen the analysis of the group-specific income dynamics, we proceed by
restricting the functional form of the initial density function to be lognormal (Glomm and
Ravikumar, 1992; Gradstein and Justman, 1997). We can show the following
Proposition 5 (Intra-group dynamics) If the initial distribution of human capital (i.e.
income) is lognormally distributed, the mean and the variance of the richer part of the dis-
tribution are always higher than that of the poorer one. While inequality of the poor group
is strictly decreasing over time, tending to zero in the very long-run (i.e. infinity), it is
strictly increasing over time, at a rate greater than 1, among the richer part of distribution.
Proof.
Let’s suppose that at time t = 0, human capital (i.e. income) is lognormally distributed
with mean µ0 and variance σ20. Namely, h
i
0 ∼ LN
(
µ0, σ
2
0
)
which also implies that the
logarithm of the human capital is normally distributed with same mean and same variance,
log
(
hi0
) ∼ N (µ0, σ20). It is hence possible to compute the dynamics of the mean and the
variance within the groups, i.e. poor and rich. From (25) let’s loglinearize the transition
equations for the two groups, as follow
log
(
hiNP,t+1
)
= β log
(
γ
1 + γ
)
+ β log
(
hiNP,t
)
(26)
and
log
(
hiP,t+1
)
= β log
(
γ
1 + γ
)
+ β log
(
hiP,t + 1
)
+ log
(
hiP,t
)
(27)
In this latter case (27) it would be not possible to compute mean and variance of
log
(
hiP,t+1
)
due to the presence of the term log
(
hiP,t + 1
)
, since the expected value of
this latter does not coincide with the expected value of log
(
hiP,t
)
, and we would be neither
sure that there is a specific distribution describing it. Nonetheless, we can approximate,
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by first-order Taylor expansion, the term to get a tractable functional form. In particular,
approximating (see appendix)
log
(
hiP,t + 1
) ≈ log (hiP,t)
we can rewrite (27) as follow
log
(
hiP,t+1
)
= β log
(
γ
1 + γ
)
+ (1 + β) log
(
hiP,t
)
(28)
Hence, mean and variance of the log
(
hiX,t+1
)
, with X = (NP,P ), are given for the
poor by
µNPt+1 = E
(
log
(
hiNP,t+1
))
= β log
(
γ
1 + γ
)
+ βµNPt (29)
σ2NP,t+1 = V ar
(
log
(
hiNP,t+1
))
= β2σ2NP,t (30)
and for the rich by
µPt+1 = E
(
log
(
hiP,t+1
))
= β log
(
γ
1 + γ
)
+ (1 + β)µPt (31)
σ2P,t+1 = V ar
(
log
(
hiP,t+1
))
=
(
1 + β2
)
σ2P,t (32)

Mean and variance for the variable h would be easily computed from (29)-(32), without
changing the qualitative analysis (see appendix). Mean income as well as inequality of the
poor group evolves being always lower than those of the richer part of the distribution.
Moreover, while within the former group inequality is decreasing over time tending at
zero in the very long-run, within the richer part of the distribution inequality is strictly
increasing over time, at a rate (1 + β)2 greater than 1. These results couple the ones
obtained in the more general setting above, showing a channel through which polarization
and marginalization are actually possibilities in very poor societies. This effect might in
turn explain both the continuous marginalization observed in less developed as well as in
developed countries and the demise of the middle class observed especially in the latter
case. This is mainly due to the fact that polarization and marginalization do fuel the
inequality traps, excluding a part of the population from fully exploiting the available
opportunities.
5.3 Macroeconomic equilibrium and aggregate economic inefficiencies
Finally, at aggregate level, we can see that the above results are consistent with the macroe-
conomic equilibrium, which is characterised on a side by the negative correlation between
inequality and economic growth and on the other by aggregate economic inefficiency, in the
poor regime, due to the wastage of economic resources. This latter economic inefficiency
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might be removed by reducing inequality, which would produce both the poverty reduc-
tion and the increase in the overall output. In each period, indeed, the current income
distribution, today, is determined by the previous one, yesterday.
In the case of an initially poor economy, h ≡ h1 > h∗L, the evolution of aggregate
educational investments and incomes is given by
Epoort =
γ
1 + γ
∞ˆ
0
hitg
(
hit
)
dhit +
γ
1 + γ
[
1−Gt
(
h1
)]
(33)
where Gt
(
h1
)
=
´ h
0 gt
(
hit
)
dhit is the cumulative distribution function at z.
Y poort =
(
γ
1 + γ
)β h∗Hˆ
0
(
hit−1
)β
gt−1
(
hit−1
)
dhit−1+
+
(
γ
1 + γ
)β ∞ˆ
h∗H
(
hit−1 + 1
)β (
hit−1
)
gt−1
(
hit−1
)
dhit−1 (34)
Firstly, the negative relation between inequality and economic growth stems from
considering that in (34) the final aggregate output would be higher by allowing more
people to reach the level of steady state h∗H . Starting from this point, indeed, the economy
grows at a higher rate than below it.
In order to evaluate more rigorously the loss in economic efficiency due to the inequality
traps, let’s consider what follows:
1. Poor class: the proportion of people owning an income ht ∈
[
0, h1
]
makes educational
investments following eNP (.) in (24) and ends up in the low equilibrium in h∗L, defined
from φNP (.) in (25);
2. Middle-“Vulnerable” class: the proportion of people owning initially an income ht ∈[
h1, h∗H
]
can spend and indeed they spend in educational investments the higher
amount eP (.), but they are still condemned in the low-equilibrium h∗L;
3. Rich class: the proportion of people owning, finally, an initially income ht ∈ [h∗H ,∞)
even spending for educational investment in the same proportion as the middle class,
end up on the explosive path, growing without bounds.
The wastage of economic resources for the economy as a whole is quantifiable from (33)
and (34) in the amount
γ
1 + γ
GMt
(
hMt
)
with GMt
(
hMt
)
=
´ h∗H
h1
gt
(
hit
)
dhit.
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This wastage, due to the inequality traps, is persistent over time and is the source
of the economic inefficiency, which might be removed by reducing initial inequality. A
reduction in inequality would, indeed, allow an higher proportion of the population to be
able not only to spend an higher amount for educational expenditure, but also to access the
societal participation at the relevant level, such to produce contemporaneously a reduction
of poverty and an increase in the aggregate output.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we evaluate how the persistence of inequality and the presence of inequality
traps carry over the persistence of poverty and possible aggregate economic inefficiencies.
We propose a microeconomic formalization of one possible definition of poverty and of the
behaviour of poor and rich agents. Poverty, net of minimum basic needs, is defined as
lack of or low societal participation, which is source of both a direct private benefit which
augments the utility of the parents linearly and an indirect gain, taking the form of a
factor increasing the human capital accumulation of the children, exponentially. This ad-
ditional benefit is so large that agents are well willing in renouncing to the consumption of
a discretionary good in order to purchase the participation good. In order to achieve this
additional gain, a specific minimum amount of the participation good must be purchased.
We hence introduce poverty ideas in the individual rationality of the agents, defining
the movements within and from poverty status as a discrete jump in the indirect utility
function to which corresponds a jump in the curvature of the human capital production
function. This is crucial not only for the endogeneization of the threshold amount of the
participation good needed to join an additional indirect benefit as well as the threshold
level of income - the poverty line - needed to buy that amount, but also for the endo-
geneization of the conditions which guarantee their existence and which fix their level.
We assemble an overlapping generation structure, in which in each period parent choose
among three goods; a discretionary one, the participation good, and educational expen-
ditures of their children. Human capital is the only factor of production which is then
mapped one-to-one to individual income. We are able to couple and enrich the dynam-
ics a la` Galor and Zeira (1993) in an economic environment with perfect capital markets,
without needing the assumption of market imperfections, by introducing a methodological
novelty which connects the presence of the externality in the production function of the
human capital of the children to the preference of the parents.
We show that two regimes may be distinguished; a poor and a rich regime. In economies
starting largely poor, the poor regime, two equilibria exists; one low locally stable equi-
librium and one upper locally unstable. Individuals whose income is under the poverty
line converge to the low equilibrium as well as the vulnerable individuals of the middle
class, defined by the proportion of individuals owning an income higher than the poverty
line, but lower than the upper unstable equilibrium. Richer individuals, whose initial in-
come is equal to or higher than the upper equilibrium end up on an explosive path, with
unbounded growth rates of personal income. In the rich regime, instead, no steady state
equilibrium does exist, as the whole population enter the explosive path, with unbounded
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growth rates. We further evaluate the intra-group dynamics, by restricting the functional
form of the initial income distribution to be lognormal. It is shown that the mean income
and the variance (i.e. inequality) of the richer part of the distribution are always higher
than the ones of the lower part; moreover, while inequality in the poor class tend to zero
in the very long-run (i.e. infinity), in the richer class of income inequality is increasing at
an increasing rate. These dynamics do appear to firstly suggest a positive support for the
current debate on the demise of the middle class and the continuous polarization of the
modern society. Further, the low equilibrium of the poor regime is closer to the notion
of inequality traps rather than poverty traps, in that the persistence of poverty is caused
by the continuously relative disadvantageous positions of the lower classes of income in
exploiting the benefits of societal participation. We find theoretical support for sustaining
that policies aimed in reducing inequality are more powerful tools for poverty reduction
when initially economies are very poor, contrary to an established claim, following which
reduction in inequality induce higher decreasing in poverty in initially richer economies.
On this ground, this paper tries to start the microeconomic and macroeconomic formal-
ization of the so called pro-poor growth theory, firstly developed in policy institutes. At
macroeconomic level, two conclusions may be furnished. Firstly, a negative relation be-
tween initial inequality and economic growth is observed, since by reducing inequality in
poor regime economies, the whole population, or higher proportions of it, is able to enter
the explosive path, producing a greater aggregate output as well. Finally, the inequality
traps which cause the poor regime to emerge are also sources of aggregate economic in-
efficiencies, which can be eliminated by reducing income disparities accordingly. Indeed,
economies trapped in the poor regime show that: 1) poor families, unable to purchase the
minimum amount of participation good, end up in the low equilibrium; 2) middle-income
families converge to the same equilibrium, even though they are able to purchase that
good, but they have not enough initial income to reach the upper equilibrium; 3) richer
families, able to purchase the “right” amount of all the bundle of goods grow richer. At
aggregate level, this implies that there is a wastage of economic resources, as although
the middle income class spends for accumulating human capital quite a lot, the final ag-
gregate output does not increase accordingly, as people in this class are still marginalised
with respect to an upper elite.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2
The proofs proceed in three steps and they apply for each individuals i and each period t.
Step 1
Let’s consider the marginal consumer which owns the exact amount of income, in terms
of the amount z of good z, needed to buy both z and e∗NP . The indirect utility function
V P is defined only when the minimum level z of good z is purchased; namely, ∀z ≥ z.
Given that e∗NP =
γ
1+γ y, this level y
1 is y ≡ y1 = z + γ1+γ y ⇒ y1 = z (1 + γ). In order to
be optimum for her to buy this bundle of goods instead of splitting the same amount of
income over the three goods, it must be verified that
V P
(
y1; θ | θ = 1) > V NP (y1; θ | θ = 0) (A.1)
That is, it must be verified that for the same level of income y1 the indirect utility,
V P , obtained by consuming the minimum amount to accede to the extra-benefit from
participation z must be greater than the one, V NP , obtained by splitting it across the
three goods, not purchasing that threshold amount and then not obtaining those extra-
benefits. That is
V P
(
y1; 1
) ≡ (1− α) log (z + 1) + γ log( γ
1 + γ
y1
)
> α log
(
α
1 + γ
y1
)
+
+ (1− α) log
(
1− α
1 + γ
y1
)
+ γ log
(
γ
1 + γ
y1
)
≡ V NP (y1; 0) (A.2)
Hence,
(1− α) log (z + 1) > α log (αz) + (1− α) log ((1− α) z)⇒
by simplifying and taking the inverse function (i.e. exponential)
⇒ z + 1 > (αz)(α/1−α) (1− α) z ⇒ z + 1 > Bz(α/1−α)z
with B ≡ α(α/1−α) (1− α) =
[
αα (1− α)(1−α)
]1/1−α
; and 0 < B < 1.
⇒ z + 1 > Bz(1/1−α) (A.3)
Step 2
It must be proved furthermore that for levels of income lower than y1 that allow to buy
the threshold amount z of good z, the consumer does not find optimum purchasing that
minimum amount by not only sacrificing the entire consumption of the discretionary good
c, but also by reducing the consumption of educational expenditures, e.
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Let’s suppose to assign to the consumer a level of income y2 lower than y1.
Given that γ > 0 only, let’s define this level of income y2 = z. It must be the case that
V P
(
y2; θ | θ = 1) < V NP (y2; θ | θ = 0) (A.4)
This would prove that the indirect utility obtained by buying only the amount z of
good z and obtaining the additional benefit is lower than the indirect utility obtained
by spending the same budget over the three goods and not achieving the benefits from
participation.
V P
(
y2; θ | θ = 1) ≡ (1− α) log (z + 1) < α log( α
1 + γ
y2
)
+
+ (1− α) log
(
1− α
1 + γ
y2
)
+ γ log
(
γ
1 + γ
y2
)
≡ V NP (y2; θ | θ = 0) (A.5)
Hence,
log (z + 1) <
α
1− α log
(
α
1 + γ
z
)
+ log
(
1− α
1 + γ
z
)
+
γ
1− α log
(
γ
1 + γ
z
)
⇒
⇒ z + 1 <
(
α
1 + γ
z
)(α/1−α)(1− α
1 + γ
z
)(
γ
1 + γ
z
)(γ/1−α)
⇒
⇒ z + 1 <
(
α
1 + γ
)(α/1−α)(1− α
1 + γ
)(
γ
1 + γ
)(γ/1−α)
· z(α/1−α) · z · z(γ/1−α) ⇒
z + 1 < C · z((1+γ)/(1−α)) (A.6)
with C ≡ α
(α/1−α) · (1− α) · γ(γ/1−α)
(1 + γ)((1+γ)/(1−α))
=
[
αα (1− α)(1−α) γγ
(1 + γ)1+γ
]1/1−α
> 0 and C < B.
Step 3. Existence and level of the threshold
In order to completely prove the proposition 1, it must showed that there exists a value
z such that (A.1) and (A.4) are contemporaneously verified. This amounts to prove that
inequalities in (A.3) and in (A.6) are contemporaneously verified as well. Let’s define three
functions as:
f1 (z) = z + 1
f2 (z) = Bz(
1/1−α)
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f3 (z) = C · z((1+γ)/(1−α))
It must be the case that
f2 (z) < f1 (z) < f3 (z) (A.7)
Let’s consider the following properties of the functions f2(.) and f3(.):
• f2 (0) = f3 (0) = 0;
• The two functions are strictly increasing in z and strictly convex, namely: ∀z >
0, f
′
2 (.) > 0, f
′′
2 (.) > 0, f
′
3 (.) > 0, f
′′
3 (.) > 0;
• The slope of the function f2 (.) is greater than the slope of the function f3 (.), namely:
B > C;
• The curvature of the function f3 (.) is greater than the curvature of the function
f2 (.), namely:
1 + γ
1− α >
1
1− α .
From these properties it results that ∃z ≡ z† : f2
(
z†
)
= f3
(
z†
)
; moreover ∀z < z†, f2 (z) >
f3 (z) and ∀z > z†, f2 (z) < f3 (z).
In particular, whenever either the degree of altruism (γ) is not extremely low or the
consumption share on the good z is not extremely low or both, the point z ≡ z† is such
that f2
(
z†
)
= f3
(
z†
)
< f1
(
z†
)
. It follows that a threshold z ≡ z ∈ [z◦, z◦◦] does exist,
where z◦ is such that f3 (z◦) = f1 (z◦) and z◦◦ > z◦ is such that f2 (z◦◦) = f1 (z◦◦).
Let’s consider the point z ≡ z† at which the functions f2 (.) and f3 (.) equal each other,
namely:
f2
(
z†
)
≡ Bz†(1/1−α) = Cz†(1+γ/1−α) ≡ f3
(
z†
)
after simple arithmetics such a point is defined as
z† =
(1 + γ)(1+γ/γ)
γ
The existence of the threshold is guaranteed whenever the value of the functions f2
(
z†
)
and f3
(
z†
)
is lower than the value of the function f1
(
z†
)
at the point z† where the functions
f2
(
z†
)
and f3
(
z†
)
do intersect each other - i.e. at the point where the functions f2
(
z†
)
and f3
(
z†
)
are equal. For this condition to be verified, it must hence be the case that
f2
(
z†
)
= f3
(
z†
)
< f1
(
z†
)
(A.8)
By substituting back the value of the point z† in either f2 (z) or f3 (z) and in f1 (z),
it follows that inequality in (A.8) is verified whenever
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B[
(1 + γ)(1+γ/γ)
γ
]1/1−α
<
(1 + γ)(1+γ/γ)
γ
+ 1 (A.9)
which is verified whenever either the degree of altruism (γ) is not extremely low or the
consumption share on the good z is not extremely low or both. Whenever condition (A.9)
is verified, it does exist a value z ≡ z ∈ [z◦, z◦◦] such that inequality (A.7) and hence
proposition 1 are both verified. This can be shown graphically as follow
Figure A.1: Existence and level of the threshold
0 z† z◦ z◦◦
f3 (z)
f2 (z)
f1 (z)
1
z
f (z)
Finally, it suffices to note that from the properties of these indirect utility functions
(see also the text):
Given that for y ≥ y V P (y; 1) > V NP (y; 0) it implies that for all levels of income
y
′
> y it will be also the case that V P
(
y
′
; 1
)
> V NP
(
y
′
; 0
)
. This property implies that
whenever she can she always decide to buy the participation good. 
Proofs for Lemma 2
The properties of the function ht+1 = φNP (ht) =
(
γ
1+γ
)β
hβt are easily derived from its
first and second derivates.
φ
′
NP (ht) = β
(
γ
1 + γ
)β
hβt−1 > 0
φ
′′
NP (ht) = β (β − 1)
(
γ
1 + γ
)β
hβ−2t < 0
The steady state h∗L is derived from
h∗L = φNP (h
∗
L) =
(
γ
1 + γ
)β
(h∗L)
β ⇒
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h∗L =
(
γ
1 + γ
)β/1−β
and the stability conditions from
φ
′
NP (h
∗
L) = β
(
γ
1 + γ
)β
(h∗L)
β−1 =
= β
(
γ
1 + γ
)β [( γ
1 + γ
)β/1−β]β−1
=
= β
(
γ
1 + γ
)β ( γ
1 + γ
)(β(β−1)/1−β)
= β < 1
Proofs for Lemma 3
The properties of the transition function ht+1 = φP (ht) =
(
γ
1+γ
)β
(ht + 1)
β ht are derived
from its first and second derivatives.
φ
′
P (ht) =
(
γ
1 + γ
)[
(ht + 1)
β + βht (ht + 1)
β−1
]
> 0
φ
′′
P (ht) =
(
γ
1 + γ
)[
β (ht + 1)
β−1 + β (ht + 1)β−1 + βht (β − 1) (ht + 1)β−2
]
=
=
(
γ
1 + γ
)β
β
[
2 (ht + 1)
β−1 − (1− β)ht (ht + 1)β−2
]
> 0
since 2 (ht + 1)
β−1 > (1− β)ht (ht + 1)β−2 ⇒ 2 (ht + 1) > (1− β)ht ⇒ ht (1 + β)+2 > 0,
which is always verified.
The steady state h∗H is derived from
h∗H = φP (h
∗
H) =
(
γ
1 + γ
)β
(h∗H + 1)
β h∗H ⇒
⇒ 1 =
(
γ
1 + γ
)β
(h∗H + 1)
β ⇒ h∗H + 1 =
(
1 + γ
γ
)
⇒
⇒ h∗H =
1
γ
and the stability condition from
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φ
′
P (h
∗
H) =
(
γ
1 + γ
)β
×
×
[(
1 + γ
γ
)β
+ β
(
1 + γ
γ
)β−1
·
(
1 + γ
γ
− 1
)]
=
=
(
γ
1 + γ
)β [(1 + γ
γ
)β
+ β
(
1 + γ
γ
)β
− β
(
1 + γ
γ
)β−1]
=
= 1 + β − β
(
1 + γ
γ
)−1
⇒
⇒ φ′P (h∗H) = 1 + β
[
1−
(
1 + γ
γ
)−1]
> 1
Lognormal distribution properties
It is shown (Aitchison and Brown, 1957; De La Croix and Michel, 2002; Glomm and
Ravikumar, 1992; Gradstein and Justman, 1997) that if a variable h is lognormally dis-
tributed with mean µ0 and variance σ20, namely if
hi ∼ LN (µ, σ2)
which also implies that
log
(
hi
) ∼ N (µ, σ2)
then, the mean and the variance of the variable h are given by
E
(
hi
)
= exp
(
µ+
σ2
2
)
V ar
(
hi
)
=
[
exp
(
σ2
)− 1] exp (2µ+ σ2)
Lognormal approximation
log
(
hiP,t+1
) ≈ log (hiP,t) (A.10)
Taking the first-order Taylor approximation, it results that
log
(
hiP,t+1
)
= log
(
hiP,t
)
+
1
hiP,t
(A.11)
For very large values of hiP,t the approximation (A.10) is consistent when considering
for instance that lim
h→∞
log
(
hiP,t
)
+
1
hiP,t
= log
(
hiP,t
)
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Simulations
Figure A.2: Simulation of condition in (A.9)
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Note: Simulations of condition in (A.9) with γ on the x-axis and the functions of γ for
each given level of α on the y-axis. The red line and the blue line represent respectively
the right hand side and the left hand side of the condition in equation (A.9).
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